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Abstract 
In this paper we uncover a network of Twitterbots comprising 13,493 accounts that tweeted the 
U.K. E.U. membership referendum, only to disappear from Twitter shortly after the ballot. We 
compare active users to this set of political bots with respect to temporal tweeting behavior, the 
size and speed of retweet cascades, and the composition of their retweet cascades (user-to-bot vs. 
bot-to-bot) to evidence strategies for bot deployment. Our results move forward the analysis of 
political bots by showing that Twitterbots can be effective at rapidly generating small to 
medium-sized cascades; that the retweeted content comprises user-generated hyperpartisan news, 
which is not strictly fake news, but whose shelf life is remarkably short; and, finally, that a 
botnet may be organized in specialized tiers or clusters dedicated to replicating either active 
users or content generated by other bots. 
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Introduction  
A sockpuppet account is a false online identity used to voice opinions and manipulate public 
opinion while pretending to be another person. The term draws from the manipulation of hand 
puppets using a sock and refers to the remote management of online identities to spread 
misinformation, promote the work of one individual, endorse a given opinion, target individuals, 
and challenge a community of users (Zheng, Lai, Chow, Hui, & Yiu, 2011). Sockpuppet 
accounts are often automatic posting protocols (i.e., bots) operating under a fictitious identity and 
as such they breach the Terms of Service of social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter. 
The administration and deployment of bots and sockpuppet accounts are largely centralized and 
rely on trivial computing routines that allow users and organizations to control substantial 
subcommunities across any given social media platform (Kumar, Cheng, Leskovec, & 
Subrahmanian, 2017). 
Concerns about the activity of bots and sockpuppets in the context of the U.K. E.U. 
Referendum were articulated in the press (Silva, 2016) and academia (Shorey & Howard, 2016), 
with researchers cautioning against the automation of political communication and the possible 
distortion of vital processes at the heart of contemporary liberal democracies, chief among which 
are competitive elections (Woolley & Howard, 2016). The scale of bot deployment and its effect 
on information diffusion are topical concerns (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016), with previous research 
reporting that bots are often deployed in contexts of polarized political discussion (Ferrara, 
Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016). We seek to contribute to this growing body of 
scholarship by scrutinizing a large network of bots that operated during the Brexit debate. We 
explored the tactics employed by bot masters deciding which tweets are retweeted and by which 
subgroup of accounts linked to the botnet. 
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The referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, specifically, was the 
fruit of more than four decades of efforts to extricate the country from the E.U. by political 
actors perennially suspicious of the supranational organization (Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016). 
The vote was portrayed as a milestone in the political life of the country (Asthana, Quinn, & 
Mason, 2016) that opened up fault lines largely at odds with the traditional alignment of British 
political parties (Becker, et al., 2016). The observed political realignment foregrounds a socio-
cultural cleavage between young and well-educated sections of the population who embrace 
progressive post-materialist values of equality, human rights, environmental protection, and a 
greater tolerance of immigrants; and on the other hand, an older, less educated demographic who 
witnessed both a decline in its material conditions and a gradual erosion of traditional values 
associated with industrial societies (Inglehart & Norris, 2017).  
The political realignment and dealignment revealed by the U.K. E.U. Membership 
Referendum throws deeply engrained ideological leanings into question (Kriesi & Frey, 2008). It 
also feeds into a context of polarization, alternative media, and hyperpartisanship consistent with 
emerging patterns of news consumption (Bastos, 2016; Starbird, 2017). While the young and 
well-educated are significantly more likely to access news via social media (Ofcom, 2017), an 
older and less educated readership is traditionally associated with tabloids, which account for a 
substantive portion of the British press (Boykoff, 2008) and are making inroads on social media 
platforms (Newman, Richard Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2016). The partisan realignment 
observed in Britain, and the context of a highly polarized political climate underpinning the 
Referendum campaign, offered fertile ground for political actors interested in developing and 
deploying bots. 
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Canvassers have strategically explored these cleavages. The successful Vote Leave 
campaign was repeatedly and intensely chastised by policymakers and media pundits for stoking 
anxiety about immigration by making misleading pronouncements about Turkey’s future E.U. 
membership. Equally, it was criticized for its disingenuous pledge to boost the National Health 
Service (NHS), a weakened pillar of the industrial welfare state in the U.K., by redirecting Great 
Britain’s E.U. membership contribution into the service (Doherty, 2016; Swinford, 2016). 
Despite these embattled claims, Vote Leave canvassers effectively relied on data analytics 
(Cummings, 2016) to capitalize on this ostensible tension between the so-called circles of hard-
working families and progressive elites, with a later analysis finding social media activity to be a 
positive predictor of the outcome of the vote (Celli, Stepanov, Poesio, & Riccardi, 2016). 
In what follows, we first ground this study in the literature on political bots—i.e., bots 
deployed in a context of polarized political debate. We subsequently show that the group of 
Twitter accounts scrutinized in this paper often tweeted in a concerted fashion and could well be 
described as a botnet or a supervised network of zombie agents—be they internet-connected 
devices (Paulson, 2006) or social media accounts (Abokhodair, Yoo, & McDonald, 2015). As 
witnessed in other cases, this pool of accounts was used to automatically replicate posts on 
Twitter (Woolley, 2016). In contrast to previous research, we identified how the botnet is 
subdivided into subnetworks dedicated to retweeting content generated either by bots or humans, 
thereby engineering different retweet cascades. As we show below, the sophistication of the 
operation deviates considerably from traditional Twitterbots. Common to most accounts in this 
botnet was the curated replication of content that was both user-generated and a reproduction of 
tabloid journalism. Another important marker of this group was the overwhelming prominence 
of content associated with or authored by user accounts affiliated with the Vote Leave campaign. 
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The overall tone of the messages was much in line with the context of disaffection with 
immigration and the cultural backlash spearheaded by older, traditional, and less educated 
readership of tabloids (Boykoff, 2008). This cultural backlash was strategically leveraged and 
maximized by populist parties and leaders in order to promote “traditional cultural values and 
emphasize nationalistic and xenophobia appeals, rejecting outsiders and upholding old-fashioned 
gender roles” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 30). Our analysis makes no claim as to the veracity 
(or lack thereof) of the facts reported by the large network of users tweeting the Vote Leave 
campaign; instead, it seeks to shed light on this unusual user base tweeting the referendum by 
sourcing hyperpartisan content which is unlikely to fit a normative definition of fake news, but 
that is likely to have played a role in the emerging and loosely defined fake news ecosystem 
(Benkler, Faris, Roberts, & Zuckerman, 2017). 
 
Twitterbots in Political Campaigns 
The literature investigating bot activity is concerned with the imitation of human activity on 
social media by computer scripts (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). These algorithms, also referred to as 
“social bots,” have been shown to approximate (Woolley & Howard, 2016) and upscale human 
conduct (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016), often influencing communication exchanges on polarizing 
topics (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016). Social bots can be deployed in a wide variety of contexts and 
constitute a growing subfield of communication and political science research, which cautions 
against their detrimental impact on electoral politics, policy discussions, and deliberation of 
contentious issues. Indeed, prominent political events such as the referendum on the U.K.’s 
Membership of the European Union or the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections were shown to have 
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been susceptible to such automated interference especially on Twitter (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; 
Howard & Kollanyi, 2016).  
Significant efforts have been made to detect patterns of activity that pertain to 
automation. Evidence to this effect points to the generation and republication of high volumes of 
partisan content with retweets—the practice of republishing a message already in circulation 
(Murthy & Dawsonera, 2013)—to boost the visibility of said content (Murthy et al., 2016); or 
alternatively, to corrupt communication (Woolley, 2016), particularly so as to create “a false 
sense of group consensus about a particular idea” (Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Gonçalves, 
Flammini, et al., 2011, p. 299). Another marker of account automation is the lack of detailed 
information about the user and the absence of geolocational metadata (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016) 
that could allow detection by users or social networking sites (Hwang, Pearce, & Nanis, 2012). 
Yet, bots can occupy an influential position in communication networks, often appearing at the 
center of highly connected network subgraphs (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016) in which information 
diffusion is centralized (Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Gonçalves, Flammini, et al., 2011). 
 Howard and Kollanyi (2016) approximated the use of political bots during the Brexit 
referendum by considering users that were extraordinarily active in the Twitter feed associated 
with the plebiscite. The authors reported that such users accounted for 32% of all Twitter traffic 
about Brexit. While acknowledging that there is no definitive way of telling which accounts are 
actual bots, they inferred that the top ten accounts producing the highest volume of messages 
(north of 350 tweets) were likely automated. Indeed, other research has described bot activity 
levels as incessant which on Twitter, specifically, translated into “excessive amounts of tweets” 
(Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). Nonetheless, user activity alone has been shown to be an unreliable 
metric to determine the presence of bots, as prolific Twitter posters can tweet abundantly by 
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taking turns managing Twitter accounts and pushing several hundred tweets a day with little to 
no automation (Bastos & Mercea, 2016; Mercea & Bastos, 2016).  
Secondly, previous research has identified political bots to be tweeting at a rate of seven 
tweets per minute or 929 tweets in 138 minutes (Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 2010). In that reported 
instance, a small botnet comprising nine Twitterbots was set up in thirteen minutes to target 
accounts of interest by virtue of their previously expressed concern with the 2009 U.S. 
Massachusetts senate race. Those bots succeeded at starting cascades retweeted by posters whose 
political alignment resonated with the content of the message (Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 2010). 
Other studies looking into the same senatorial elections have shown that botnets can raise 
retweeted URLs to the top of Google search results (Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Gonçalves, 
Patil, et al., 2011). 
However, the investigation by Bessi and Ferrara (2016) into the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Elections found that overall humans posted more tweets than bots within the period under study. 
Furthermore, bots seemed inept at interacting with humans, replying (i.e. by quoting one’s 
Twitter handle preceded by the @ character) primarily to other bots. In their turn, humans were 
replying to humans more than to bots, another marker that humans and bots operate in largely 
disconnected subgraphs. These results are somewhat at odds with the political botnet studied by 
Metaxas and Mustafaraj (2010), which directed replies at recipients purposefully selected for 
their partisan interest in the Massachusetts elections, a quarter of whom went on to retweet the 
automated message they received (Mustafaraj & Metaxas, 2017). The variability of @-
mentioning and retweeting practices indicate that bot masters are likely implementing a range of 
different strategies depending on the political objective set for the botnet. 
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Notwithstanding, the bots recorded in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections were effective 
information disseminators. They were just as apt as humans at retweeting, republishing a similar 
volume of content to humans. Similarly, in the case of the E.U. referendum, the most prolific 
accounts did “not generate new content but simply retweeted content from other users” (Howard 
& Kollanyi, 2016). While the latter scholars conceded that human agents could achieve similar 
levels of activity if they confined themselves exclusively to retweeting, Bessi and Ferrara (2016) 
cautioned that bots could have a debilitating effect on human communication because of their 
noted capability to disseminate content among human users. 
Finally, Howard and Kollanyi (2016) claim that in the E.U. referendum bots were 
designed to take sides in the debate about the U.K.’s membership of the European Union. 
Similarly, Bessi and Ferrara (2016) determined that bots produce systematically more positive 
content in support of a candidate, a fact they submitted can distort perceptions of support for that 
candidate. Similarly, Woolley (2016) posited that accounts exhibiting bot activity feature 
prominently in Twitter “bombs:” streams of tweets that flood into hashtags used by opponents 
and are retweeted by bots so as to disrupt the communication and organization of the opposite 
side. In summary, the literature on political bots offers a growing catalogue of metrics for 
pinpointing political bots (Abokhodair, et al., 2015; Ferrara, et al., 2016; Ratkiewicz, Conover, 
Meiss, Gonçalves, Patil, et al., 2011; Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Gonçalves, Flammini, et al., 
2011), but little is known about the actors controlling these bots, the decisions on which tweets 
are to be retweeted, and the type of content relayed by such accounts (Nied, Stewart, Spiro, & 
Starbird, 2017). 
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Research Objectives 
With this study we seek to identify a large network of bots that tweeted the Brexit debate and the 
type of content relayed by these accounts. We explore bot activity with insights into the 
prevalence of hyperpartisan and polarizing content (Benkler, et al., 2017), which constitutes our 
first Research Objective (RO1). To this end, we began with an inspection of the webpages 
attached to tweets to identify the domain name of websites sourcing information to bots. Next we 
hypothesized that bot activity would be marked by a high-volume posting signature followed by 
a drop in activity levels characteristic of the lifecycle of bots (RO2). To this end, we conducted a 
time series analysis and modelled the mean cascade time of bots and active users in the Twitter 
referendum data, thus distinguishing seasonal patterns and the posting behavior of political bots. 
Research Objectives RO3 and RO4 probe the impact of bot communication on the Brexit 
debate. We inspected our dataset to determine whether bots could generate greater message 
cascades than active users (RO3). In close connection, we calculated the maximum, minimum, 
and mean cascade time to ascertain if bots triggered faster cascades than active users in the 
network (RO4). We thus scrutinized the impact of bots as an upshot of the intensity, reach, and 
speed of their activity, in addition to examining their network influence and the information 
dissemination patterns that characterized their actions during the last month of the E.U. 
referendum campaign. We relied on such metrics to contrast the activity patterns of bots with 
regular users, as well as of different types of bots operating within the same botnet.  
We subsequently inquired whether the accounts that were swept up in the retweet 
cascades were also bots themselves. We envisioned that the impact of a botnet may depend on 
whether it is embedded in a larger network of active users or, alternatively, restricted to a cluster 
of bots (RO5). Our hypothesis was that the more engagement with human agents the botnet 
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generates, the more likely it is to widen cascades beyond the botnet. In other words, we would 
expect botnets to exhibit levels of human curation (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016) that testify to their 
differentiated optimization and their fundamentally cyborg nature. We adopt the latter term to 
reflect on the close coupling of human agency and computer scripts characterizing bots that 
disruptively amplifies human communication (Asenbaum, 2016). 
Lastly, we hypothesized that the botnet is subdivided into various subgroups dedicated to 
retweeting specific accounts, thereby triggering different types of retweet cascades. To this end, 
we examined retweet activity to distinguish patterns of human and bot activity as well as 
interactions between them that could evince strategies of bot deployment (RO6). This last 
Research Objective seeks to establish whether bots are deployed and operate in a concerted 
fashion; or, alternatively, whether competing strategies are employed to overcome the enduring 
risk that the botnet will be trapped in so-called “echo chambers,” i.e., groups of bots self-
referentially communicating with each other. 
 
Methods and Data 
We queried the Twitter Streaming API to monitor 39 Twitter hashtags clearly associated with the 
referendum campaign from April to August 2016 (e.g. #voteleave, #voteremain, #votein, 
#voteout, #leaveeu, #bremain, #strongerin, #brexit, #euref, etc.). For the purposes of this study, 
we focus on the two-week period before and after the referendum vote, i.e., June 10 to July 10, 
2016. In this interval, we collected approximately 10M tweets associated with the referendum. 
We subsequently retrieved the profile of over 800K unique users that appeared in our dataset and 
relied on thresholding and filtering approaches to disentangle real users from bots (Table 2). The 
combination of methods reported in the literature (Subrahmanian et al., 2016; Varol, Ferrara, 
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Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2017) allowed us to identify a large group of bots whose accounts 
had been deactivated by the bot master or blocked/removed by Twitter in the aftermath of the 
referendum. We relied on the implementation of extended regular expression in R (2014) to 
identify the campaign associated with tweets and the libcurl implementation (Temple Lang, 
2016) to retrieve the webpage title of URLs embedded in tweets (when available). 
Previous research found the frequentist approach to user activity alone to be an unreliable 
metric to determine the presence of bots, as prolific Twitter posters can tweet abundantly by 
taking turns and pushing several hundred tweets a day with little to no automation (Bastos & 
Mercea, 2016; Mercea & Bastos, 2016). Consequently, in the attempt to differentiate between 
bots and high-volume posters, we analyzed several metrics of user activity in addition to the 
temporal posting patterns of potential bots. This composite analysis allowed us to ascertain if 
their activity endured over time; or conversely, if there was a notable drop in activity levels that 
might typify what may be described as a “bot lifecycle,” in the wake of the E.U. referendum. 
The metrics used in this study to identify bot accounts are informed by the relevant 
literature and include detailed profile information, presence or absence of geographical metadata 
(or propensity to post using web clients), retweet to tweets ratio, @-mention to tweet ratio, 
activity level, followers to followees ratio, account creation date, and absence of known words in 
the username (Table 2). Positive predictors of bot activity are shown in Table 2 and include 
tweets to user (tw2user), mean tweet to retweet (tw2rtMean), common words in the username 
(commonWords), use of web interface to relay content (webClient), ratio of outbound to inbound 
@-mentions (mentionOut2In), ratio of inbound to outbound retweets (retweetIn2Out), account 
creation date (newAccount), retweet reciprocity (rtReciprocity), and retweet cascade mean time 
(ccdMeanTime). For the purposes of this study, we contrast retweeting behavior observed in this 
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group against the larger set of accounts we refer to as active users (as opposed to deactivated or 
recycled users, defined underneath). Retweet and @-mention behavior are defined as AB when 
B retweets A and AB when A mentions B (thus following the directionality of the information 
flow). While previous studies have explored Twitter cascades by tracking the diffusion of URLs 
(Bakshy, Hofman, Mason, & Watts, 2011) and hashtags (González-Bailón, Borge-Holthoefer, 
Rivero, & Moreno, 2011), we rely on retweets to inspect user-to-bot and bot-to-bot cascade 
composition. 
Unfortunately, it is not currently possible to rebuild every step of the retweet cascade, as 
each retweet includes only a reference to the original message, so that if user C retweets user B 
who has previously retweeted user A, we can only establish that user A was retweeted by user C, 
with the intermediary steps of the cascade remaining unknown. As such, we cannot account for 
independent entry points that might have influenced the cascade (Cheng, Adamic, Dow, 
Kleinberg, & Leskovec, 2014). However, given that each retweet includes a unique identifier 
arranged chronologically from the original tweet to the most recent retweet, we can rebuild 
cascades from the seed message to the retweets that have cascaded from that original content. 
Similarly, we rely on the timestamp attached to each tweet to estimate the variable time-to-
retweet, calculated as the time elapsed between the original tweet and the ith retweet for cascade 
of size S. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
The research data examined in this study was collected via the publicly accessible Twitter 
Streaming and REST APIs. Although the information collected for this study is public, there are 
important ethical issues associated with harvesting public Twitter accounts (Zimmer, 2010). 
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Twitter profiles set to private were removed from our pool of users and no private information 
was examined in the analysis. While we have looked to preserve users’ rights and interests, we 
ultimately decided to disclose the Twitter handles examined in this study whenever there was a 
reasonable level of certainty that we were dealing with Twitterbots, to which ethical 
considerations of privacy are immaterial. We also considered the potential sensitivity of some of 
the tweets examined in this study, but anonymizing the seeding accounts would impinge on our 
ability to understand the scope of the botnet and the strategies adopted by bot masters. Lastly, we 
have considered the ethical obligation not to display deleted Tweets, but we believe the content 
analyzed in this study is of public and scholarly interest, and that ethical considerations regarding 
users’ rights to not have their deleted tweet made public are immaterial in the context of large 
botnets participating in politically contentious debates. 
 
Results 
From a total of 794,949 Twitter profiles that tweeted the Vote Leave and Vote Remain 
campaigns, we managed to identify the location of 60% of them (482,193) by triangulating 
information from geocoordinates embedded in tweets (i.e. reverse geocoding), geographic 
information tweeted by the users, and information that appeared in their profiles. From this 
cohort of users, only 30,122 users were identified as based in the U.K., a smaller population than 
the set of 40,031 accounts that have been deactivated, removed, blocked, set to private, or whose 
username was altered after the referendum. This latter group of accounts represents 5% of all 
users that tweeted the referendum and is divided as follows: 66% or 26,538 were users who have 
changed their username since the referendum but remained active on Twitter (designated 
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hereafter as repurposed or recycled accounts); 34% or 13,493 accounts were suddenly blocked or 
removed themselves from Twitter (deleted accounts).  
Although repurposed/recycled accounts conspicuously interacted with deleted Twitterbot 
accounts, the focus of this study lies with the latter cohort. Notwithstanding, common to these 
two subgroups is the predominance of retweeted content that disappeared from the internet 
shortly after the referendum. Another commonality is the notable support for the Leave 
campaign, measured by the relative frequency of keywords and hashtags associated with each of 
the campaigns. While the ratio of messages using hashtags that supported the Leave and Remain 
campaigns was 31% and 11% for the entire network, recycled and removed accounts combined 
tweeted the Referendum hashtags to a ratio of 37% and 17% (or 2,434,077 and 840,726 versus 
30,947 and 14,390 tweets for each of the campaigns, respectively). In what follows, we 
disentangle these groups to finally concentrate on a set of 13,493 accounts identified as bots. 
 
Hyperpartisan and Perishable News 
By annotating tweets using textual markers such as hashtags and keywords associated with the 
Leave and Remain campaigns, we found that the proportion of tweets supporting the Vote Leave 
campaign in the pool of removed accounts was yet higher, at 41% compared with 31% for active 
users, with the proportion of neutral tweets also being higher in the latter. Slogans associated 
with the Vote Leave campaign were also significantly more likely to have been tweeted by this 
pool of accounts in a ratio of 8:1. This subset of removed accounts was considerably more active 
in the period leading up to the referendum, with an average of 4.4 messages compared with 3.9 
for the rest of the population (x̄=4.44 σ=33.3, and x̄=3.99 σ=74.2, respectively); and also less 
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active in the wake of the vote with an average of 2.4 tweets compared with 2.6 for the global 
population (x̄=2.42 σ=9.0, and x̄=2.61 σ=63.2, respectively). 
Upon attempting to retrieve the webpages (RO1) tweeted by recycled and removed 
accounts, we found that most tweeted URLs (55%) no longer exist, cannot be resolved, or link to 
either a Twitter account or a webpage that no longer exists. Nearly one third (29%) of the URLs 
link to Twitter statuses, pictures, or other multimedia content that is no longer available and 
whose original posting account has also been deleted or blocked, a marker of the perishable 
nature of digital content at the center of political issues (Walker, 2015). From this total, 1% of all 
links was directed to user @brndstr, one of the few accounts appearing in the communication 
network of recycled accounts that remains active under the same username. This account is 
managed by Dubai-based “Bot Studio for Brands,” a company specialized in providing bots for 
social media campaigns. 
A closer inspection of the accounts sourcing content to the pool of recycled and removed 
accounts reveals the markedly short shelf life of user generated content. These are Twitter 
accounts invested in spreading dubious news stories sourced from a circuit of self-referencing 
blews (Gamon et al., 2008): a combination of far-right weblog such as WorldTribune.com and 
traditional tabloid media such as express.co.uk. However, the few webpages we managed to 
retrieve indicate that the content tweeted by this large pool of recycled and removed accounts 
does not conform with the notion of fake news designating news stories that are intentional, 
misleading half-truths and/or outright lies (Benkler, et al., 2017). Instead, the content is in line 
with a form of storytelling that blurs the line between traditional tabloid journalism and user-
generated content, which is often anonymous, fact-free, and with a strong emphasis on 
simplification and spectacularization (Rowe, 2011). User-generated content takes the lion’s share 
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of hyperlinks tweeted by recycled and removed accounts. The content is often presented as a 
professionally-looking newspaper by resorting to content curation services such as paper.li and is 
likely to include Twitter multimedia (e.g., Twitter’s native multimedia sharing service 
twimg.com). 
Similarly, the few links that remained accessible six months after the referendum can 
hardly be described as fake news. The hyperlinked material is rich in rumors, unconfirmed 
events, and human-interest stories with an emotional and populist appeal that resembles tabloid 
journalism, except for the added complexity that audiences play a pivotal role in curating and 
distributing the content. The sources we managed to inspect, though not representative of the 
much larger universe of content tweeted by this population of users, and that unfortunately has 
mostly vanished from Twitter, is much akin to hyperpartisan tabloid journalism, with a topical 
emphasis on highly-clickable, shareable, and human-interest driven stories (Bastos, 2016). Table 
1 summarizes the URLs tweeted by this cohort of users. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Although 17% of weblinks point to Twitter accounts that are still active, a random sample shows 
that the original message is frequently no longer available, thus preventing any determination of 
the nature of the content originally tweeted. A good example is the tweet ID 
740138870092750848 which generated a cascade of several hundred retweets and whose posting 
user is still active. Although the user account seeding the cascade remains active, the original 
tweet has been removed (together with the relevant retweet cascade). With Internet Archive 
having no record of this specific tweet, it is no longer possible to know what the original image 
conveyed. The scale of deleted content applies both to weblinks tweeted by this population as 
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well as to user accounts, a worrying development given the importance and contentious nature of 
the referendum (Walker, 2015). 
 
Brexit Botnet 
Turning to the removed user accounts, we relied on metrics discussed in the relevant literature 
(Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ratkiewicz, Conover, Meiss, Gonçalves, Patil, et al., 2011) to determine 
whether the pool of deleted accounts comprised a large network of Twitterbots. Upon inspecting 
the account creation date, we found that 83% of accounts in the botnet had been created in the 
previous 2 years compared with 43% for the subset of active accounts and 48% for accounts that 
ended up being recycled. We interpreted the result as an important indication of bot activity. The 
highest rate of tweet to retweet was found in the campaign accounts @iVoteStay and 
@iVoteLeave, with a retweet to tweet ratio of 90% and a total number of retweets of nearly 60K 
messages. These accounts did author original content though, and we do not feel confident they 
can be classified as bots despite the extraordinary high levels of activity and the high likelihood 
that some form of automation was used to relay content. 
When analyzing retweet rate across groups, we found that the baseline for accounts that 
remained active after the referendum was of one retweet to each 3 tweets (x̃=0.33 and x̄=0.45), 
while the ratio for accounts that changed their usernames is twice as high (x̃=0.61 and x̄=0.54). 
The group that significantly deviates from this baseline is the set of accounts removed after the 
referendum (i.e., the botnet). For such accounts, the retweet rate is of 1 retweet for every tweet, 
with 54% of accounts never having authored any tweet related to the referendum (i.e., only 
retweets were registered for these accounts, another marker of bot activity). For this group of 
accounts, the median tweet to retweet rate is 1 (x̄=0.6302). Table 2 shows the metrics used to 
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classify this subset of accounts as bots in a network of 13,493 Twitterbots that tweeted a total of 
63,797 messages. The variables in the table indicate tweets per user, retweet to tweet ratio, 
incidence of known words in usernames, propensity to post using web clients, @-mention 
indegree to outdegree, retweet indegree to outdegree, account creation date, outdegree and 
indegree transitivity, retweet reciprocity, modularity score, mean and maximum cascade size, 
number of cascades triggered, share of triggered cascades, and cascade mean time. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Botnet Lifecycle 
After establishing that this subnet consists primarily of automatic posting protocols, we 
approached RO2 by contrasting activity levels in active accounts and the botnet. While the 
activity of active users presents the usual seasonal patterns associated with Twitter activity, 
including the ebb and flow of messages resulting from daily patterns associated with work and 
leisure (Puschmann & Bastos, 2015), tweets posted by bots follow no such variation. The 
absence of seasonal patterns provides an indication that the time signature observed in the botnet 
deviates considerably from the remainder of the user base tweeting the referendum. Moreover, 
botnet activity is marked by a higher level of activity compared with active users in the period 
leading up to the referendum, and a sharp decrease immediately afterwards, an indication that 
this pool of accounts was either retired or expelled from the platform. Figure 1 shows the tweet 
activity for the period of June 10 to July 10 (two weeks before and after the referendum of June 
23), with botnet activity markedly higher in the period before the referendum followed by a 
sharp decline thereafter. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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The histogram in Figure 1 presents a sharp decline in bot activity immediately after the 
referendum, much in line with the assumptions surrounding RO2. In addition to the short 
timespan the botnet was kept alive, the structural network of retweets disseminated by 
Twitterbots shows greater integration when compared with the network of active users, with 
significantly lower measures of transitivity (i.e., measure of clustering) and higher modularity 
(i.e., tendency for a network to be organized into subnetworks, as shown in Table 2) due to an 
abundance of hub-to-spoke formations found across the bot subnet. The botnet appears organized 
in specialized tiers dedicated to replicating tweets originating either from active users or bots. 
Such formations are abundant but restricted to bot-retweet-bot and bot-retweet-user formations, 
with little crossover between such formations. 
Beyond hashtags, the content tweeted by bots presents a clear slant towards the Leave 
campaign, with the three most frequent words being “Brexit,” “referendum,” and “VoteLeave,” 
which together account for 9% of all terms tweeted by the botnet. In comparative terms, 31% of 
tweets posted by bots included the term “leave” as opposed to 16% for the group of active users. 
Remarkably, 17% of tweets posted by the botnet also included the term “remain” compared with 
only 11% for the group of active users, an indication that although the botnet tweeted 
predominantly pro-Leave messages, it also tweeted more pro-Remain campaign messages. The 
result alludes to the patent partisanship espoused by such accounts in comparison with the larger 
community of users tweeting the referendum. 
We addressed RO3 by analyzing the tweet-to-retweet ratio and the cascade mean time 
across groups, which provides an indicator of whether bots were successful at generating large 
retweet cascades. We found that despite the imbalance in the ratio of retweeted messages for 
these accounts (Table 2), bot activity was largely successful to the extent that it attained a 
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retweet ratio of 2:1 between active users and bots. In other words, the much larger pool of active 
users retweeted on average every second message posted by bots. This estimate appears 
unusually high and we detail the causes for this surprisingly high ratio when addressing RO5 and 
RO6.  
 
Retweet Cascades 
The largest retweet cascade (S=13,417) was authored by a user making a direct reference to 
@brndstr, the Dubai-based startup specialized in social media bots. The message read “I #VoteIn 
for the #Brexit #EURef vote with @Brndstr & unlocked my own Flag Profile pic! What will you 
vote? #ivoted https://t.co/iFlZyhrzLd” (the link directs to @brndstr Twitter account). Another 
tweet with the same content but starting with “I #VoteOut for the #Brexit #EURef” is the third 
largest cascade in the data. In short, @brndstr messages were directed at both Leave and Remain 
campaigns with the purpose of placing the company within the larger conversation, automated or 
otherwise. Despite these large cascades, @brndstr is connected to a relatively small number of 
cascades, particularly in view of the magnitude of the botnet which includes over 10K accounts 
devoted to supporting one or the other side of the referendum campaign. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
We could not reject the assumption underlying RO3 that bots would be less effective at 
triggering retweet cascades. In fact, the botnet is considerably more effective at joining 
successful cascades, with a mean cascade participation of x̄=18 (compared with x̄=6 for active 
users). The botnet is also just as effective at generating large retweet cascades compared with 
active, regular Twitter users and/or accounts that have been repurposed during the period of this 
study. While such regular users started 36% of cascades, the botnet claimed a total of 30% of 
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cascades (34% were generated by accounts repurposed at the end of the referendum period). 
Interestingly, the same long-tailed distribution of hyperactive accounts among regular users is 
observed in the botnet, where a small share of bots was found to have triggered most retweets, 
with the remainder of the bots being strategically although peripherally positioned to retweet the 
initial cascade (Figure 2). While the group of active users tweeted 97% of the messages and 
initiated 7.5% of all cascades, the botnet tweeted under 1% of the total messages in the dataset, 
but accounted for a comparable share of 6% of all cascades. 
We approached RO4 by comparing the distribution of user activity and cascade mean 
time between active users and bots. As is often the case with Twitter data, user activity, hashtag 
use, and cascade time (calculated as the average time T for a cascade of size S) follow a long-
tailed distribution. User activity and cascade time are particularly skewed in the botnet subgraph, 
whose power-law distribution comprises a single user responsible for 4% of all tweets 
(@trendingpls) followed by a set of four accounts which together account for an additional 5% 
of the activity (namely, @EuFear, @steveemmensUKIP, @uk5am, and @no_eusssr_thx). These 
few accounts have been removed or deleted after the referendum, although the accounts 
@trendingpls and @uk5am have been recreated in October 2016 and now operate under a new 
user ID. Beyond these highly-active accounts, the botnet presents a mean of 5 tweets per bot 
(compared with 1.2 per human user). 
Despite the different distributions, the average cascade time is comparable between the 
two groups, with botnets starting and completing cascades of size 5, 10, and 20 retweets just one 
minute faster than active users. The mean cascade time provides an indication that bots mimic 
the average timespan of retweet cascades, or more likely, that they retweet real-world accounts to 
maximize exposure to the message or to the user posting the original content (RO4). In fact, 
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taken together, botnet and the active user groups have not just similar cascade size and time, but 
also similar averages for cascade mean time at 69h for active users and 65h for the botnet. For 
medium-sized cascades (S=40, S=80, and S=160), the botnet completes the cascade 20 minutes 
faster, but it is with large cascades—S>320 and S<640—that larger temporal differences are 
observed, with the botnet completing such large cascades 1.5-2 hours faster than the active user 
base. Figure 3 unpacks this relationship: while cascade time linearly grows for the active user 
base, the fitted linear regression for cascades seeded by bots, and the bulk of the observations, 
falls close to the baseline of just a few minutes or hours. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
We approached RO5 by examining the difference between the average bot cascade and the 
outliers in the botnet. These differences shed light on the existence of at least two tiers or clusters 
of fundamentally different bots. The first group is dedicated to replicating automated content, 
hence achieving a much faster cascade turnaround compared with active user-generated 
cascades. The second group is deeply embedded in human-driven activity. These two types of 
bot activity are depicted in Figure 4 which foregrounds the substantially different groups of bots. 
While the formation on the left is geared towards replicating content exclusively from active 
users, the formation on the right is dedicated to replicating content seeded by other automatic 
posting protocols. Both accounts succeeded at generating medium (S>50) and large cascades 
(S>100), but their typical retweeting patterns indicate they were created and deployed to meet 
fundamentally different objectives. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
This finding sheds light on RO6, which seeks to distinguish patterns of human and bot activity 
along with interactions that might cut across the two subgraphs. While the first subset of bots 
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was associated with accounts that leveraged retweet behavior to amplify the reach of a small set 
of users and rarely if ever started any cascade themselves, the other subset of bots had a narrower 
scope of operation only retweeting other bots in the botnet and thereby producing many medium-
sized cascades that spread significantly faster than the remainder of the cascades. As shown in 
Figure 4, both bots deployed to retweet active users and bots developed to retweet other bots 
exhibit different retweeting patterns. Although both @trendingpls and @nero are bots, the first 
only retweets active users whereas the retweet activity of the latter is restricted to other bots, 
likely deployed in conjunction with the head node. Each of the bot subnets play a specialized 
role in the network, and both feed into the larger pool of regular accounts brokering information 
to @vote_leave, the official Twitter account of the Vote Leave Campaign, and arguably the most 
prominent point of information diffusion associated with the Leave Campaign. 
As to its time distribution, the retweet activity was mostly concentrated in the period 
leading up to the referendum vote (Figure 1). Most of it consisted of organic retweets from and 
to accounts in the active user base. Bots operated in the same period both by retweeting active 
users and retweeting other bots, chiefly in the week preceding the vote (June 16-23) and in the 
eve of the referendum (June 21), when we observed a peak in retweet activity between bots. 
There was a sharp decline in retweet activity after the referendum, principally among active 
users who ceased to trigger or join retweet cascades. On the other hand, bots remained 
operational and activity peaks are observed on Jul 12-15: first retweeting active users, then 
replicating bot content, only to tail off in the following weeks when the botnet is retired, 
deactivated, or removed entirely from the Twitter platform. In fact, head nodes of the bot-to-bot 
subnet such as @NoThanksEU, @wnwmy, @Foresight1st, @nero, @horrorscreens00, and 
@Dugher101 disappear after the end of the referendum (only @NoThanksEU was reactivated in 
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November 2016). This is the critical period (June 2016) when content tweeted by such bots and 
the webpages linked to their tweets disappeared from the internet and Twitter public and 
enterprise APIs (search API and GNIP, respectively). 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The timewise evolution of large cascades in Figure 5 sheds light on RO6 by showing the peak of 
retweet activity between active users, between bots, and the hybrid variant of bots retweeting 
active users which account for a considerable portion of retweet cascades in the botnet. 
Notwithstanding the apparent success achieved by the botnet, we caution against extrapolating 
the analysis of cascade triggering to the effects these bots might have had on the referendum 
debate. Although the botnet can trigger small and medium-sized cascades effortlessly, and even 
participate in large ones, bots are particularly ill-suited to starting large cascades due to the 
unique constraints associated with growing and maintaining a botnet. In fact, the botnet failed to 
generate any large cascade of 1K retweets, while the active user base successfully generated 
nearly one hundred such cascades. Similarly, while the botnet generated only 5 cascades of 
S>500, the active user base generated as many as 237 of them. Thus, we advise caution in 
diagnosing the potential impact of a botnet on the larger conversation on Twitter. Although these 
accounts can impinge on the broader conversation and boost the reach of a subset of users, we 
have yet to find evidence that they can manipulate the Twittersphere. 
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we uncovered a network of Twitterbots comprising 13,493 accounts that tweeted 
the U.K. E.U. membership referendum which were deactivated or removed by Twitter shortly 
after polling stations closed. We have shown that the botnet tweeted mainly messages supporting 
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the Leave campaign and argued that such bots may likely be repurposed from one campaign to 
the next by the social media analytics outfits. The botnet can thus be operated as an army of 
sockpuppet accounts deployed to amplify a defined group of user by aggregating and retweeting 
content tweeted by seed users, which may conceivably be bots themselves, a process that 
corporate literature refers to as “false amplification” chiefly orchestrated by “fake accounts” 
(Weedon, Nuland, & Stamos, 2017). 
Nonetheless, our analysis has not found evidence of widespread fake news diffusion with 
political bots. Instead, we found a combination of what appears to be a Twitter botnet feeding 
and echoing user-curated and hyperpartisan information. The material that remained available 
after the referendum points to a significant milestone in tabloid journalism, which is 
incorporating audience feedback while undergoing a transition from the strong editorial identity 
of tabloid newsprint to content curation that is both user-generated and created by paid staff 
members (Bastos, 2016). The hyperpartisan content pushed by the botnet epitomizes an ongoing 
trend to push viral content that is mostly short, shareable, accessible with mobile devices, and 
that accentuates polarized identities and balkanizes readerships into like-minded groups 
(Sunstein, 2001). 
The botnet exhibited clear patterns of specialization with sets of accounts dedicated to 
retweeting active users and another set of bots positioned to echo campaign slogans and follow 
communication tactics directed by other bots. The likely overhead involved in setting up such a 
specialized botnet pays off during the automation of retweets, which allow the botnet to trigger 
small to medium-sized cascades in a fraction of the time required by active users to start 
cascades of comparable size. Despite the botnet’s capacity to rapidly trigger such cascades, we 
have not found evidence supporting the notion that bots can substantively alter campaign 
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communication, as the activity of the botnet—at least of this defunct botnet in particular—was 
relatively minor with respect to the larger conversation about the referendum that took place on 
Twitter. 
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Table 1: Weblinks tweeted by deleted accounts 
1 Dead link (external) 54.30% 11 facebook.com 0.50% 
2 Valid link (Twitter) 17.20% 12 dailymail.co.uk 0.50% 
3 Dead link (Twitter)   8.60% 13 twimg.com 0.50% 
4 express.co.uk   1.70% 14 Suspended account 0.30% 
5 theguardian.com   1.60% 15 cnn.com 0.20% 
6 youtube.com   1.40% 16 petition.parliament.uk 0.20% 
7 bbc.co.uk   1.10% 17 virgin.com 0.20% 
8 @brndstr   1.00% 18 paper.li 0.20% 
9 telegraph.co.uk   0.60% 19 thesun.co.uk 0.20% 
10 bloomberg.com   0.50% 20 reuters.com 0.20% 
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Table 2: Metrics of automated activity for active users, recycled accounts, and bots. Predictors of 
bot activity shown in bold 
 Active Recycled Botnet 
users 1,641,472 26,538 13,493 
tweets 6,546,998 103,606 63,797 
tw2user 3.988492 3.904062 4.72815 
tw2rtMean 0.451069 0.539010 0.63021 
commonWords 0.138760 0.137341 0.12963 
webClient 0.233227 0.241327 0.34726 
mentionOut2In 1.204246 1.984704 2.92922 
retweetIn2Out 1.035133 1.669028 1.82125 
newAccount 0.428071 0.476256 0.82619 
rtTransOut 0.005570 0.000876 0.00097 
rtTransIn 0.005553 0.001292 0.00140 
rtReciprocity 0.064109 0.001830 0.00076 
modularScore 0.574058 0.666160 0.602234 
cascadeMean 7.370980 8.005936 8.087834 
cascadeMax 13417 1344 860 
patZero 7.4% 7.2% 6.2% 
patZeroShare 36% 34% 30% 
ccdMeanTime 69h 102h 65h 
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Figure 1: Twitter activity before and after the referendum. The vertical black line marks the date 
of the referendum (23 June 2016), with blue and red horizontal lines showing the density curves 
for active users and bots, respectively. The dark purple area in the histogram shows the relative 
proportion of user activity that overlaps with bot activity 
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Figure 2: CDF of tweets, hashtags, and retweet cascades for active users and Twitterbots 
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Figure 3: Time-to-cascade and mean cascade time for active users and Twitterbots 
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Figure 4: Two-tiered botnet, with bots specialized in retweeting active users and bots dedicated 
to retweeting other bots. Vertice and edge color identify source of information 
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Figure 5: Large cascades (S>506) from user to user, bot to bot, and user to bot 
 
